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THE EXPRESSIVE POWER OF RABBINIC LAW
RICHARD H. MCADAMS*

T

HIS is a great event for a magisterial book and I am glad to be a part
of it. I was asked in my invitation to address the expressive powers of
law. So my role here today is to examine Professor Saiman’s book,
Halakhah: The Rabbinic Idea of Law,1 from the perspective of that body of
literature. My comments are somewhat discursive. I will not state that
there is a single way in which the book relates to the literature on law’s
expressive powers, but will endeavor to show multiple intersections. I try
to be critical of some of the points that I make and that lead me to other
points.
To begin, many rules in the halakhah are expressive in the simple
sense that they are not enforced by legal sanctions. The one that struck
me immediately is the death penalty as a sentence for certain crimes. In a
sense, all criminal punishment could be described as expressive in that,
following Joel Fineberg, it is not merely the infliction of harsh treatment
on rule violators on account of the violation, but an infliction of harsh
treatment on rule violators on account of the violation for the purpose of
denouncing or condemning them for that kind of rule violation.2 But, a
criminal sanction is even more purely expressive when it’s not actually
ever imposed. We then have a statutory rule that expresses that some
crime deserves some particular punishment, and the nominal punishment
merely identifies how serious the offense is—how strongly it needs to be
condemned. It doesn’t in any real sense provide for the punishment to be
inflicted.
The Jewish law of capital punishment seems to be expressive in this
purely symbolic sense. First, there are procedures that make it impossible
to actually implement. Beyond that, near the end of the book, Professor
Saiman describes as possibly just rhetorical some rabbinic claims that certain behavior deserved capital punishment. Those are examples of law as
purely expressive.
Yet this expressive example and others do not tell us if expressive theory has any special insight into the halakhah, i.e., whether the expressive
theories of law, the ones I contributed to or others, have any bearing on
our understanding of Jewish law. Much of the theory on expressive powers of law, including my own, seeks to explain how law has the power to
* Deputy Dean and Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, University of
Chicago Law School.
1. CHAIM N. SAIMAN, HALAKHAH: THE RABBINIC IDEA OF LAW (2018).
2. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397
(1965).

(725)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 8

726

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64: p. 725

influence behavior by mere expression. This expressive literature views
law as influencing human behavior in ways independent of threatening
sanctions and by more than what the psychologist or sociologist might call
the legitimacy of law. Before I got to my own work on this, I realized some
people simply and sweepingly explain the other effects of law as saying
that people internalize the obligation to obey law. I was always critical of
the notion that people have internalized generally a duty to obey law because my observation is that most people violate many laws and obey many
laws. That they violate many laws doesn’t look to me like people feel some
strong internalized duty to obey law in general. So, that leads many to
think that most people have internalized the duty to obey some specific
laws. That seems right to me but I didn’t think it could be the first explanation of people obeying the law. As a psychological matter, it seemed
like people would have to obey a law before they could internalize it. I
really didn’t understand psychologically how people could, at one time, be
flouting the law and then one day internalize the law and the next day
start obeying it; rather it seems like they would be obeying the law and
then after time they would internalize it and then that means that we have
to explain step one—why they obey the law before they have internalized
it—before we get to step two, internalization.
So, that’s what I tried to do with expressive theory, to explain how
people first come to obey certain laws and not others, and not for reasons
of deterrence or what is conventionally understood as legitimacy.3 Here, I
will just name without explanation two specific expressive theories of law’s
influence on behavior: a theory about law as a coordination device, and a
theory about law as information.
Yet, Professor Saiman’s book was somewhat humbling for me because
it points out something important that I had neglected. I had been focusing on the expressive power of secular law. The halakhah does not require expressive powers because religious law has special resources. Here,
you can explain obedience in terms of human development: when you are
not yet an adult, your parents tell you to do certain things; if they are
insistent, then you tend to do them. That certainly includes religious practice. So, we could explain internalization as follows: children start to practice the rituals and rules of a religion because—step one—they obey
persistent adult instruction and then—step two—they come to internalize
them. We don’t have a need for any other theories of legal compliance,
including expressive ones.
Against this sense of doubt, I came to think that nonetheless there are
some important connections between expressive theories and this sensational book. Some specific rules of halakhah seem to reflect some expressive concerns, that is, some ways of trying to get the law to influence
behavior beyond the mechanism of deterrence or religious-based internal3. See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS
LIMITS (2015).
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ization. These are tentative ideas and I should perhaps apologize for their
functionalist quality. I will not here justify functionalism, but this is how I
tend to see legal rules. And to be clear, functionalism need not be a theory of how the rules came to be; it doesn’t have to be why the rules were
motivated in the first place. It could just be that rules that are functional
tend to last longer than rules that are not functional. Rules might not
come into being because of their functionality but when rules turn out to
be dysfunctional there is a greater push to get rid of them. So, functionalism can exist alongside non-functionalist explanations in that both can
have some truth to them.
Now to my first example of applying some element of expressive theory to halakhah: Many of the rules here are about how to honor someone
or something, e.g., how to honor the dead, how to honor the Sabbath, etc.
This connects with what I describe as law’s ability to help people coordinate when they need to coordinate. Some of the examples of coordination I use in talking about law’s coordinating function are mundane
matters of traffic: to avoid a traffic accident, you have to find a way to
coordinate. At an intersection, you might like to go while the other person stops, but if the law just proposes that you are the one that stops, then
you might think that the mere proposal will make the other person think
that you will stop. If the other person thinks you’ll stop, then they won’t
stop; if they won’t stop, you do want to stop, and when you do, you are
obeying the law. In this case, the law’s mere suggestion creates self-fulfilling expectations that people will obey the law.
This works also with the need to have a coordinated understanding
among individuals for what it means to give honor to something. For example, consider a federal statute, United States Code title 4 section 8,
which describes how to honor the American flag, e.g., how to display the
flag, how to store it, and how to dispose of it when it is tattered in a manner that pays the flag respect.4 This statute caught my attention because it
is purely expressive because the First Amendment prohibits punishing anyone for not following this statute. Does it mean it has no function? Absolutely not. The statute likely affects behavior because there are some
people who are motivated to honor the flag. They might realize that
within any country large in geography and population, absent some centralized articulation of the rules for honoring the flag, that you would have
divergent norms emerge in different parts of the country. This could lead
to a situation where people living in two different towns follow two different customs and each of looks in horror at how the other town treats the
flag thinking it’s disrespectful even though they are both motivated by the
desire to show respect. Burning the flag, for example, is often a form of
protest but the statute proscribes that, at the end of the flag’s natural life,
one honorable way of disposing of it is to burn it. You can imagine there
is real possibility of disagreement. The law helps to solve this coordination
4. 4 U.S.C. § 9 (2018).
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problem just by articulating the rituals of honoring the flag. You could
ignore them because there is no consequence but you realize that other
people will now interpret your behavior as honoring the flag so it helps
you coordinate.
With the internet, it might seem all too easy to solve the coordination
problem among dispersed people who want to agree on a set of behaviors
that show honor. But this was certainly a difficult problem for many centuries, when there would have otherwise been a tendency for local divergence. Just as the appearance of a dialect may make it difficult for people
who at one point spoke the same language to communicate, local variation could threaten this sense of unity within a single religion as to how to
give honor to people and things and ideas. So the people need an expressive law, which can coordinate without needing sanctions. That is one example that I wanted to give you.
A second example has to do with an idea that Professor Meir DanCohen once described with the term “acoustic separation.”5 I don’t think
I understood how much Dan-Cohen’s ideas matter to the expressive powers of law until I read Professor Saiman’s book and something clicked into
place. I should begin by explaining acoustic separation. Dan-Cohen
imagines (borrowing from Bentham) that legal rules always have two audiences: (1) those who are directed to follow the rule, frequently the general
public, and (2) those officials who are directed to enforce rules by sanctioning violators.6 If a rule tells the public how to behave, Dan-Cohen
calls it a “conduct rule,” while a rule that tells officials when to sanction
individuals is a “decision rule.”7
Dan-Cohen observes that, in the real world, the same statute, ordinance, judicial decision, etc., tends to serve as both the conduct rule and
the decision rule, addressing the two audiences with the same text.8 Now,
in theory we could acoustically separate the audiences, and if we did we
could separate the rules, which would create some new possibilities. Why
would we want to do that? In fact, we usually value governmental transparency, and the idea of acoustic separation makes the decision rule nontransparent to the people affected by it.
Dan-Cohen agrees with that as a presumption—that presumptively
transparency is good. He explores the exceptional cases where he thinks
there might be some advantage to separating the rules. A perfect acoustic
separation—perfect non-transparency—is impossible anyway, but he
imagines that there could be some selective transmission of the rules.9
One example he gives is the duress defense in criminal law.10 Critics of
5. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L REV. 625 (1984).
6. Id. at 630.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 631.
9. Id. at 635.
10. Id. at 632–33.
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the defense worry that, if people know that they have a defense when they
are pressured to commit a crime, they might too easily give into the pressure and commit the crime because they know the defense exists. DanCohen imagines that maybe the ideal would be to have a conduct rule
where you just say, “don’t commit the following acts, which are crimes.”
You don’t tell the people about the duress defense, but as a decision rule
you tell the enforcers, “If people are subjected to duress, don’t bother
enforcing the conduct rules against them.” Then individuals being pressured to commit crimes would desirably hold out against the pressure for
longer than when they know the defense exists. Yet we would never actually wind up punishing people we think don’t deserve it or are undeterrable because of the pressure that they were under, because the decision
rule tells the enforcers not to do so. In sum, selective transmission might
sometimes accomplish a social good.
I think we can generalize this point. Start with the obvious point that
law tends to be dichotomous: you are either married or you are not, the
defendant is either liable or he or she is not. Law is dichotomous in many
cases where it is nonetheless trying to influence behavior along a continuum. When the behavior is continuous, we often want to encourage people to do something as much as possible. We might decide that it is good
for people to save water in a draught and the more water conservation the
better. Or if individuals bear a duty to return lost property, the greater the
effort they make to return it, the better. But, when we’d like to push people along some continuum, a dichotomous legal rule is a poor tool. If we
set the standard very high, it might be that a lot of people find compliance
too costly and there is widespread disobedience of the rule, which then
loses its effect. But, if we set the standard too low, it might cause those
already willing to provide more of that good behavior to decrease their
contribution because the rule tells them there is no liability above some
minimal point. Some exemplary citizens, who have been contributing far
more than average without knowing it, might then look at the new rule
stating the minimum and realize they can cut back their efforts and still
comply. Given this kind of problem, there can be an advantage to acoustic
separation or at least the more realistic alternative of selective
transmission.
What does this have to do with halakhah? Well, first, maybe it seems
nothing because if it is a virtue to study the Talmud then selective transmission is difficult or impossible because everyone knows the law. Universal study of the Talmad would mean there is only ever one audience for
the rules, not two. And yet, it seems to me, that maybe some of the indeterminacy and open-endedness of the halakhah might create something
like acoustic separation. Here I guess I am following Christine Hayes’ view
in reading the book to see in halakhah the tendency at times to lead to
perpetual uncertainty. Consider then that Professor Saiman’s book at one
point discusses where the Talmud itself struggles with the choice of selective transmission.
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On page seventy-eight, Professor Saiman presents a question concerning the ritual of the showbread. Rabbi Ami states, “Even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning, and one in the evening, He has
fulfilled the obligation derived from scripture, this Torah shall not depart
from your mouth.”11 The Talmud then addresses but leaves open the
question of whether this minimalist view should be taught to “the unlearned.” One rabbinic opinion is that it is forbidden to teach this lesson
in the presence of the unlearned, but the other rabbinic opinion is that it
is a “commandment” to teach the lesson to the unlearned. Distinguishing
what is to be said to individuals based on their mastery or ignorance of the
Talmud seems like a form of acoustic separation or selective transmission.
Of course, the difference here is that the separation is not to have a different rule for officials as from the governed, but to have one rule for the
governed for who are learned in the rules and another rule for the governed who are not learned. You might imagine that it perhaps could be
functional to distinguish between them. Perhaps those who study the Talmud could be trusted to do more than the minimum after they have already internalized the values of the halakhah, where those who are not
learned are more likely to do only the stated minimum. This would be
very much like telling particularly manipulable individuals in society what
the criminal law rule is without mentioning the defense of duress so they
would hold out against pressure as long as possible, but telling people of
strength and independence that the duress rule exists.
Dan-Cohen also discusses how actual law brings about selective transmission through a variety of doctrines and practices that are not normally
understood to have this function.12 One of them is the vagueness or obscurity of a rule.13 Here, we should consider the striking example from
around page ninety of Professor Saiman’s book. There is a discussion of
the eating rights of workers. The employer has to provide some food during the workday for the workers. The question is: how much food? There
is an interesting disagreement. One possibility is to give very limited eating rights, just whatever the local custom is. But note that stating a conduct rule with a very minimal definition of eating rights might create an
“expressive spill-over” of lowering the food that some employers would
otherwise have provided to their workers. We might therefore like to have
a conduct rule that demanded more than minimal eating rights even
though we would prefer a decision rule that refrains from enforcement as
long as the minimal local custom is followed.
If everyone gets the rule from the same place, there is no selective
transmission. So, we might deal with this problem by having a vague standard. Just say that one must provide a reasonable amount of food; perhaps that works. The vagueness of it would stop you from lowering the
11. SAIMAN, supra note 1, at 78.
12. Dan-Cohen, supra note 5, at 637–41.
13. Id. at 639.
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contributions of people inclined to contribute more. The problem is that
some employers will give less than is reasonable, so we want a specific rule
that they can’t go below and yet if we do that explicitly, we signal to the
employers that they can get away with giving less.
I found it interesting that the Mishna might provide a functional solution. It states here the rule but also states what to me, sounds like a
counter rule, that, “even a feast like Solomon’s at the height of his grandeur” may not be enough. So, perhaps this creates a state of uncertainty
that works to accomplish what a vague standard would accomplish. Everyone then knows they have to give the minimum, but many may be less
than certain that giving just the minimum is actually sufficient. Earlier
today, Professor Hamoudi referred to this idea in Islamic legal thought
where some people want to be safe, and it wouldn’t hurt to do more. And
so maybe that is what is accomplished by having, not a vague standard, but
a rule paired with a counter-rule. The resulting uncertainty is the same,
and it raises the contribution of the employers inclined to give the least
without lowering the contribution of the employers inclined to give the
most.
I am now out of time but let me just say that I have learned a lot from
the book and from the other speakers today. Thank you.
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